Mooney Miscues 
The MOA Pilot Magazine Page 34, February, 2001

 An IFR M20K/252 Goes Down…Tragically

Valuable interpretations and evaluation of NTSB/FAA Accident and Incident Reports as evaluated separately by Mooney experts who may help us never repeat them.  How sadly we realize that those who deny history are often destined to repeat it!

By Robert Wilkens Hazlett, CFII and Paul K. Sanchez CFII

Preliminary NTSB Accident Analysis
#NYC01FA040

NTSB Identification: NYC01FA040
Accident occurred:  NOV-26-00 at RIXFORD, PA
Aircraft: Mooney M20K/252
Injuries: 3 Fatal. 

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors but is a verbatim copy of an official Preliminary NTSB Report.  Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final NTSB Report has been published.

On November 26, 2000, about 1120 Eastern Standard Time, a Mooney M20K, was destroyed when it impacted terrain, while maneuvering near Rixford, Pennsylvania. The certificated private pilot and two passengers were fatally injured. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. An instrument flight rules flight plan was filed for the flight, between Bradford Regional Airport, Alton, Pennsylvania, and Yeager Airport (CRW), Charleston, West Virginia. The personal flight was conducted under 14 CFR Part 91. A review of the air traffic control audio transmissions revealed that at 1053, the pilot requested, and received, clearance to take off from Bradford Airport's Runway 14.

At 1056, the pilot reported that he wanted to return to the airport. He then made two additional calls, in which he stated that he wanted vectors back to the airport. After the third call, the controller from Cleveland Center asked if "five two mike whiskey" was calling. The pilot answered yes, and stated again that he'd like to get vectors back to the airport. He also stated that he had an engine emergency, but did not reveal the nature of the emergency. After the pilot stated he wanted vectors, the center controller responded that he did not have the airplane in radar contact. When the pilot did not respond, the controller called him again, and the pilot responded that he heard him "loud and clear." The controller reiterated that he did not have the airplane in radar contact, and that he could not give the pilot vectors. He then asked the pilot for his position, but the pilot did not respond.

About a minute later, at 1058, the pilot of another airplane, which was on the ground at Bradford Airport, reported that he had seen the Mooney 252 on his TCAS (Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System), and that it appeared to be on a short final for Runway 32. The controller responded that he'd like to know when the airplane landed, and that hopefully, the Mooney pilot would then be able to talk to him about what occurred. About 1059, a voice similar to that of the accident pilot, transmitted, "can you see the field or the runway? i'm trying to get down."  

For approximately the next 1 1/2 minutes, the controller talked to other airplanes. He then asked the accident pilot if he was on the ground at Bradford. The pilot responded that he was not, and asked if the controller had him on radar. The controller replied that he did not, that the pilot's airplane was too low. The controller then asked the pilot if he was on final approach, and the pilot responded that he was not.

At 1102, the controller advised the pilot that he had the airplane on radar, at 3,500 feet, and asked if the pilot had made a missed approach at Bradford. The pilot responded, "no sir, unable. i'm trying to get the engine here to [unintelligible]." He then asked the controller for a radar vector. The controller asked him if he wanted vectors for Runway 32, and the pilot confirmed that he did. The controller then told the pilot that he would have to maintain 3,500 feet or greater, that the airplane was in radar contact, and to fly a heading of 170 degrees. The pilot acknowledged the heading. About 1/2 minute later, the controller asked the pilot if he could maintain 4,000 feet. The pilot stated that he thought he could, and controller then told him to climb to 4,000 feet, which the pilot acknowledged. About 1103, the controller stated that the airplane was about 2 miles northwest of Bradford Airport, and that he'd vector the airplane to the outer marker, at 4,000 feet. The pilot did not answer.

A minute later, the controller asked the pilot if he were on a 170-degree heading, and the pilot responded that he was, but then said he was "one forty now." The controller then asked the pilot to verify his transponder code, but the pilot did not answer. The controller attempted to contact the pilot three more times, but the pilot still did not answer. At 1106, the controller stated that radar contact was lost again, and the airplane's last known position was over the Bradford Airport. The pilot answered, "okay." The controller then confirmed, with the pilot, that the pilot was unable to make a visual approach, and asked the pilot if he were on a 170-degree heading. The pilot first responded that he was on a 160-degree heading, and shortly thereafter, a 170-degree heading. The controller responded that the pilot's transmissions were "breaking up." He then informed the pilot that he was not on a 170-degree heading, but a 070-degree heading. The controller then twice repeated the 170-degree heading, for vectors for the "localizer three two approach." The controller then stated that the airplane was 2 miles north of Bradford Airport; however, the pilot did not respond.

At 1109, the controller attempted to call the pilot again. About 15 seconds later, the pilot stated that he was on a 150-degree heading, at 4,000 feet. The controller told the pilot to maintain the 150-degree heading, and 4,000 feet. He also stated that the airplane was about 3 miles north of the airport, and shortly thereafter, told the pilot that he had to make a right turn to 150 degrees, which the pilot acknowledged. At 1110, the pilot asked the controller if the airplane was in radar contact. The controller responded that he had contact occasionally, and that the last time he had contact, the airplane was 4 miles northeast of the airport. About 10 seconds later, the pilot stated that the airplane was at 4,400 feet. The controller acknowledged the call, and reported that he was not receiving the airplane's transponder. At 1111, the controller asked the pilot if he was on a 150-degree heading. The pilot confirmed that he was, and the controller stated that he was going to give the pilot a no-gyro turn to the right. He then told the pilot to turn right, but did not receive a response. The controller repeated his instructions, but again received no answer. The controller then told the pilot that if he received the last instruction, the pilot should "ident."

No additional transmissions were heard, until 1112, when the controller told the pilot to stop the turn. The pilot responded that that he was stopping the turn, then said, "heading three five [unintelligible]." The controller replied, "no...you should be heading one seven zero, now turn right, heading one seven zero." Again, the pilot did not respond. Shortly afterwards, the controller asked the pilot to ident again. About 20 seconds later, at 1113, there was an unintelligible transmission. The controller stated that he received the pilot's ident, and directed the pilot to make a right turn, for a "no-gyro vector for Bradford." There was no response from the pilot. At 1114, the controller told the pilot to stop his turn, and to ident if he received the transmission.

Shortly thereafter, the controller asked the pilot of the airplane on the ground at Bradford Airport if he would be willing to launch, and lead the Mooney back toward the airport. The pilot agreed, and at 1117, was cleared for takeoff, from Runway 32. The pilot never made contact with the accident airplane, nor were any additional transmissions heard from it.

A witness at Bradford Regional Airport reported that the airplane departed at 1055, and that, at 1057, the pilot reported an emergency, and was going to return to the airport. At 1103, the airplane flew over the airport from south to north, "with no contact." The airplane then made a 180-degree turn just north of the field, then flew over the airport, from north to south, "with the bottom of the aircraft in sight for just a very short time." The witness further stated, "at the time the aircraft went from north to south, it sounded like the prop was cycling." Radar returns, which were sporadic, were within 3 nautical miles of the crash site.

During the time of the returns, the airplane was maneuvering, in a generally northeast direction, at altitudes ranging from 4,500 feet to 3,500 feet. Weather, recorded at Bradford Regional Airport at 1053, included winds from 170 degrees true, at 4 knots, visibility 5 statute miles in light rain and mist, an overcast cloud layer at 200 feet, a temperature of 40 degrees Fahrenheit, and a dewpoint of 40 degrees Fahrenheit. The weather recorded at 1153, included winds from 210 degrees true at 4 knots, visibility 4 statute miles in light rain and mist, an overcast layer at 200 feet, a temperature of 40 degrees Fahrenheit, and a dewpoint of 40 degrees Fahrenheit. The pilot of the search airplane reported that the clouds at the time of his takeoff were "solid, 300 to 400 feet off the ground." Additionally, he reported the top of the clouds as ill-defined, at 5,700 feet. According to the Airport/Facility Directory, the elevation at Bradford Regional Airport was 2,143 feet. The airport was located on a large plateau, in an area of rolling hills and mountains. Instrument approaches at the airport included an ILS RWY 32 approach, and a VOR/DME or GPS RWY 14 approach.

The airplane's wreckage was located on rising terrain, about 10 statute miles northeast of Bradford Airport, at 41 degrees, 54.73 minutes north latitude, 78 degrees, 29.99 minutes west longitude. A trail of tree impact marks, bent over trees, and cut branches, commenced about 150 feet prior to the ground impact point, and descended at an angle of 8 degrees, on a heading of 300 degrees magnetic. The airplane's ground impact point was at the base of a bank, which led up to a shoulder of a dirt road. Much of the wreckage, including the engine and the cockpit area, came to rest on top of the shoulder. The wreckage site elevation was about 2,120 feet above mean sea level. All flight control surfaces were accounted for at the accident site. The cockpit area had been consumed in a post-crash fire. The propeller had separated from the engine. One blade showed no leading edge damage, while the other exhibited leading edge gouging, chordwise scoring, and minor "s-bending." The engine could not be rotated due to impact damage. The spark plug electrodes were gray in color. The vacuum pump was examined, and the interior walls of the housing exhibited rotational scoring. The engine was retained for further examination. The airplane's maintenance records were not located at the accident site.

According to maintenance work orders, on July 1, 2000, the pilot authorized repairs, as a result of a propeller strike during a hard landing. The repairs resulted in a propeller replacement, and an engine disassembly, inspection, and reassembly. The work was completed on August 28, 2000. On August 31, 2000, the fuel flow gauge was removed, for readings of 35 to 45 gallons per hour, and it was reinstalled October 17, 2000. On September 27, 2000, the airplane entered maintenance for an engine oil leak. A leak was pinpointed to the right magneto, which required the replacement of its gasket. Another leak was located in the center of the number 4 cylinder, which resulted its replacement. The maintenance was completed on October 24, 2000.

A flight instructor noted that, during a later flight, when the pilot was receiving training for his instrument rating, the tower asked if the airplane "always smoked that much." The airplane was examined after the flight, but no discrepancies were found. The pilot's logbook was not located at accident site. According to copies of recent training records, he received his private pilot certification on June 9, 2000, and his instrument rating on November 16, 2000. According to his last flight instructor, the pilot had taken all of his training in the accident airplane. The pilot also possessed a third class medical certificate, dated January 7, 2000.

According to the pilot's application for his instrument rating, as of November 16, 2000, the pilot had 184 hours of total flight time, with 142 hours of instruction received. He also had 43 hours of instrument time.